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Abstract: Background/Objectives: The genus Acinetobacter demonstrates resistance to antibiotics
and has been shown to spread in the hospital environment causing epidemic outbreaks among
hospitalized patients. The objectives of the present study was to investigate the antibiotic resistance,
biofilm formation, and clonality among Acinetobacter baumannii strains. Materials and Methods:
The study involved 6 (I Outbreak) and 3 (II Outbreak) A. baumannii strains isolated from patients
hospitalized in vascular surgery unit. Results: All tested A. baumannii strains were extensively drug
resistant (XDR) and all the isolates were carbapenem-resistant and among them, all carried the
blaOXA-51 gene, the blaOXA-24 gene, as well as the blaOXA-23 gene. All of the investigated strains had
the ability to form a biofilm, but all of them produced less biofilm than the reference strain. Multi-
locus sequence typing (MLST) showed that all strains belonged to the ST2 clone. Pulsed-field gel
electrophoresis (PFGE) divided the tested outbreak strains into two clones (A and B). Conclusion: This
study shows a nosocomial spread of XDR A. baumannii ST2 having the blaOXA-51 gene, the blaOXA-24
gene, as well as the blaOXA-23 gene, low biofilm formers, that was prevalent in the vascular surgery
unit. To identify the current situation of vascular surgery departments targeted epidemiological
investigation was needed. Effective implementation of infection control prevented the spread of the
epidemic outbreaks.
Keywords: Acinetobacter baumannii; extensive drug resistance; ST2 clone; OXA-23; epidemiological
investigation; hospital outbreak
1. Introduction
Acinetobacter baumannii has become one of the most difficult healthcare associated
infection pathogens to control and treat. It has, recently, demonstrated a rapid increase
in resistance to antimicrobials, being multidrug-resistant (MDR) and extensively drug-
resistant (XDR) [1]. A. baumannii can cause pneumonia, bloodstream, urinary tract, and
surgical site infections [2,3]. It has been shown to spread in the hospital environment
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causing epidemic outbreaks among hospitalized patients because of its ability to colonize
the skin as well as medical devices and the respiratory tract of patients and health care
workers [4,5]. It also has the ability to form biofilm on inanimate surfaces [2,6]. The
potential to form biofilm and the possession of a drug resistance mechanism seem to be the
way to enhance viability in the hospital environment [7].
The resistance of A. baumannii strains in Poland has been constantly on the rise for
many years. Currently, according to the data from the European Antimicrobial Resistance
Surveillance Network (EARS-Net), the Polish isolates of Acinetobacter sp. resistant to
carbapenems, fluoroquinolones and aminoglycosides constitute 62.9%, which puts our
country among several European countries with a high percentage of resistant strains
(Latvia 56.8%, Bulgaria 66.4%, Italy 75.7%, Romania 77.6%, Cyprus 78.2%, Greece 81.3%,
Lithuania 85.1%, Croatia 90.8%) [8]. Pandrug resistant bacteria (PDR) and XDR isolates
of A. baumannii have been reported for many years, not only in Polish hospitals, but also
globally [9–13]. Infections caused by these strains are a serious therapeutic issue and
are particularly common among intensive care unit (ICU) patients, but also appear in
people hospitalized in other departments [14–19]. It seems that A. baumannii is one of the
main etiologic agents of hospital associated infections (HAIs) and epidemic outbreaks in
Poland, compared to infections caused by other non-fermenting bacteria (Pseudomonas
aeruginosa), which are less frequently reported in our country [9,20,21]. For two decades in
Poland, A. baumannii infections have been a significant proportion of healthcare-associated
infections (especially in ICUs) but there are only a few reports from Poland characterizing
these pathogens and the conditions of epidemic outbreaks [20,22,23].
The main purpose of this study was to characterize the A. baumannii strains causing
hospital outbreaks in one of the hospitals in Kraków that occurred in 2017 and 2018. The
second aim was to evaluate the management of the A. baumannii outbreaks.
2. Materials and Methods
2.1. Bacterial Isolates
The study involved 6 (I Outbreak, IO) and 3 (II Outbreak, IIO) clinically significant non-
duplicate A. baumannii isolates isolated from surgical site infections (SSIs) and wounds derived
from patients hospitalized in the vascular surgery unit in a specialist hospital in Kraków.
Species identification was carried out with biochemical tests (Neferm Test Erba Lachema
Polska) and then verified by a matrix-assisted laser desorption ionization time-of-flight mass
spectrometry (MALDI-TOF) biotyper (Bruker Daltonik GmbH, Bremen, Germany).
2.2. Antibiotic Resistance
Antimicrobial sensitivity testing was performed using the disk diffusion method. The
following antimicrobials were tested (all discs were from Oxoid): ceftazidime (CAZ 10 mg),
imipenem (IMP 10 mg), meropenem (MEM 10 mg), ciprofloxacin (CIP 5 mg), levofloxacin
(LEV 5 mg), amikacin (AK 30 mg), gentamicin (GN 10 mg), tobramycin (TB 10 mg),
netilmicin (NT 10 mg), and trimethoprim–sulfamethoxazole (SXT 1.25/23.75 mg), excepting
evaluation of the minimum inhibitory concentrations (MICs) of colistin by the broth
microdilution (MIC-Strip Colistin, Merlin). Drug susceptibility was interpreted according
to the guidelines of the European Committee on Antimicrobial Susceptibility Testing
(EUCAST) guidance (clinical breakpoint tables v.8.0; www.eucast.org/clinical_breakpoints/
(accessed on 6 February 2021)) [24]. XDR strains were defined as those strains that were
susceptible to no more than two antimicrobial classes [25].
2.3. Screening for Metallo-β-Lactamase Phenotype
The metallo-β-lactamase (MBL) mechanism of resistance was detected by double-
disk synergy test (DDST) with an EDTA disk (10 µL 0.5 M EDTA, pH 7.3–7.5), disks of
ceftazidime (CAZ 30 mg; Oxoid) and imipenem (IMP 10 mg; Oxoid) placed 20 mm apart
from a disc containing EDTA. The test was considered positive if the inhibition zone around
the disc with CAZ and/or IMP was enhanced [26].
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2.4. Screening for Carbapenemase Type Beta-Lactamases Phenotype
The Klebsiella pneumoniae carbapenemases (KPC) phenotype of resistance was detected
by combined disc test (CDT) with meropenem disks (MEM 10 mg; Oxoid) and boric acid
(20 µL 15 mg/mL boric acid). The test was considered positive if the zones around the disc
with MEM and MEM+boric acid differed by 7 mm (or more) [27].
2.5. Polymerase Chain Reaction
DNA templates were extracted using a Genomic Mini kit (A&A Biotechnology, Gdynia,
Poland) according to the manufacturer’s instructions. All isolates were screened for the
presence of four MBL genes in a multiplex polymerase chain reaction (PCR): blaVIM (390 bp),
blaIMP (188 bp), blaSPM-1 (271 bp), and blaGIM-1 (477 bp). PCR analysis was performed using
previously published primers and conditions [28].
PCR was also used to screen for the four blaOXA genes: blaOXA-23 (116 bp), blaOXA-24
(151 bp), blaOXA-51 (112 bp), and blaOXA-58 (141 bp) in A. baumannii isolates. To detect specific
DNA sequences, the pairs of specific primers described by Huang et al. were used [29].
The insertion element ISAbaI (301 bp) located upstream of the blaOXA-51 gene (112 bp)
was detected separately in a PCR reaction using primers and conditions as described by
Pasanen et al. [30].
2.6. Biofilm Formation
A biofilm formation assay was carried out as described by Merritt et al. [31]. Biofilm
formation was tested on the M63 medium (Amresco, Solon, OH, USA) supplemented with
casein (Oxoid Ltd., Hampshire, UK) after 28 h. The obtained crystal violet absorbance
values corresponded to the amount of biofilm produced by each strain. The mean ab-
sorbance values for the control wells for each microtiter plate were subtracted from the
mean absorbance values for each strain, allowing all strains to be compared on parameters
of variable distribution (mean and SD) with the biofilm-forming A. baumannii ATCC 19606
reference strain.
2.7. Multi-Locus Sequence Typing
Multi-locus sequence typing (MLST) was performed as described by Diancourt
et al. [32] with a Pasteur scheme. Sequencing of housekeeping genes cpn60, fusA, gltA,
pyrG, recA, rplB, rpoB was performed by Genomed SA (Warsaw, Poland), and the resulting
sequences were analyzed using the ChromasPro 1.4 software (Technelysium Pty Ltd., South
Brisbane, QLD, Australia). Sequence types (STs) were determined by comparison to the
PubMLST database [33].
2.8. Pulsed-Field Gel Electrophoresis
Analysis of genetic similarity between A. baumannii strains was performed using
pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) in accordance with a previously published pro-
tocol [34]. Electrophoresis was conducted using the CHEF III PFGE system (Bio-Rad
Laboratories, Inc., Hercules, CA, USA). Gel Compar II 6.5 (Applied Maths, Sint-Martens-
Latem, Belgium) was used for cluster analysis using the Dice coefficient and unweighted
pair group method with arithmetic mean. Isolates with more than 95% similarity were
clustered together as identical.
2.9. Characteristics of Hospital
The vascular surgery department (VSD) occupies one floor in a historic hospital
building established over 100 years ago. In 2017 and 2018, totals of 1832 and 1756 patients
were admitted to the hospital, respectively. The hospital offers vascular surgery procedures
such as non-bifurcated aortic prosthesis, aortic-bifemoral prosthesis, suprapubic extra-
anatomical femoral prosthesis, and femoropopliteal prosthesis surgery, endarterectomy,
percutaneous angioplasty with stent implantation, endovascular aortic repair, percutaneous
transluminal angioplasty, thrombectomy, thromboendarterectomy, embolectomy. In 2017,
Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2021, 18, 1563 4 of 15
as well as in 2018, there was a total of 44 beds in the VSD. There were 7 physicians present
in the unit per working day and 1 on each night shift, and 11 nurses on each working day
and 4 at night shifts.
2.10. Epidemiological Investigation
To control and eliminate IO and IIO, epidemiological investigation and activities were
undertaken by the infection control team (ICT), including the activity of an epidemiological
nurse. In the epidemiological investigation, 34 swabs from the inanimate environment
of the VSD (washbasin taps, soap dispensers, hand care lotion, dressing trolley, cleaning
equipment, shower tray, soap, computer keyboard, blood pressure monitors, bed mattress,
ECG machine, mop after washing, the air in the OR, surgical scrub sinks) and 11 tests from
the healthcare workers (hand swabs from physicians and nurses) were taken. The samples
were collected from surfaces of 10 cm2 area using sterile flocked swabs (Copan Liquid
Amies Elution Swab; Copan Diagnostic Inc., Murrieta, CA, USA). Then the swabs were
cultured as described by Różańska et al. [35]. Tests taken from healthcare workers hands
were made on TSA Contact with Disinhibitor plus TWI plates (Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc.,
Waltam, MA, USA). The cultured species were identified with biochemical tests (Neferm
Test; Erba Lachema s.r.o., Brno, Czech Republic) and then verified by MALDI-TOF biotyper
(Bruker Nano GmbH; Berlin, Germany).
Healthcare workers’ hand hygiene and the use of personal protective equipment
were evaluated according to the WHO guidelines on hand hygiene in health care [36].
Disinfection in the unit, including equipment disinfection, was monitored by an epidemi-
ological nurse. The air in operating theaters was tested using the sedimentation method
as described by Kaiser and Wolski [37] using TSA + neutralized/irradiated 90 mm plates
(bioMérieux, Craponne, France). The plates were placed in three different heights, and the
time of exposition was 30 min.
2.11. Statistical Methods
Statistical analysis was performed using R Language and Environment for Statistical
Computing software [38]. The significance level for all statistical tests was set at p ≤ 0.05.
ANOVA analysis and the Tukey post hoc analysis were performed to compare every strain
with each other (Tukey multiple comparisons of means). And also the Dunnett post hoc
analyses were performed to compare each strain with the control strain.
All collected data entered into the database and analyzed during this study were
previously anonymized and de-identified.
3. Results
3.1. Characteristics of Patients
Analysis of the patients population data showed that the median patient age in IO
was from 64 to 82 year (mean: 73.5) and in the IIO was 59 to 81 (mean: 70). The majority
of patients were female in IO (5 vs. 1), and male in IIO (2 vs. 1) (details in Table 1). All
patients were hospitalized in the vascular surgery unit and operated on due to vascular
disorders. The average length of stay was 7 days. All patients were treated with antibiotics
before being operated, but we were unable to access this information. All patients in IO
and all from IIO had surgical site infection (SSI). The patients 252/17 and 342/17 had SSI
caused by HAI pathogens and were then colonized by an XDR A. baumannii strain after a
few days. Patients from IO were cohorted in the same rooms in 2017 and those from IIO in
one room in 2018. All patients were discharged from the hospital in good condition after
both IO and IIO.
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Type Accompanying/Preceding Disease Outbreak No.
PUS of IO 72 - F
11 May–12 May 2017













F 15 August–06November 2017 VSD (217) SSI
hypertension, COPD, CKD, DM,
PAD, chronic ulceration
I
252 64 F 11 September–20October 2017 VSD (218) SSI hypertension, DM, chronic ulceration
262 81 F 15 September–03November 2017 VSD (218) SSI hypertension, heart failure, ulceration
282 66 M 29 September–30October 2017 VSD (216) SSI
hypertension, PAD,
DM, previous surgeries
342 66 F 19 September–30October 2017 VSD (216,218) SSI
PAD, ulceration, previous
hospitalization in another hospital,
DM2
343 82 F 24 September–30October 2017 VSD (204,207) SSI












hypertension, antibiotic therapy due
to SSI, DM2, previous hospitalization
and surgeries
II
284 59 M 27 February–23August 2018 VSD (209) SSI














SSI hypertension, PAD, previoushospitalization and surgeries
M—male, F—female, PUS—possible unconfirmed source, BTC—bronchial tree colonization, VAP—ventilator-associated pneumonia, UTI—urinary tract infection, CRBSI—catheter-related bloodstream infection,
ICU—intensive care unit, VSD—vascular surgery department, COPD—chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, CKD—chronic kidney failure, DM—diabetes mellitus, PAD—peripheral artery diseases, IO—first
outbreak, IIO—second outbreak.
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3.2. Characteristics of A. baumannii Strains
All A. baumannii strains (n = 9, 100%) were resistant to all of the antimicrobials tested,
with the exception of colistin, so that all were classified as XDR strains (details in Table 2).
Susceptibility to colistin was shown by 8 (90%) A. baumannii strains, only one (no. 279/17;
10%) was resistant based on EUCAST recommendations. Neither the EDTA test nor the
KPC screening test gave positive results. The presence of the blaOXA-51 gene, the blaOXA-24
gene, as well as the blaOXA-23 gene was confirmed in all A. baumannii strains tested. The
blaOXA-58 gene, the ISAba1 element or the blaVIM-1, blaIMP, blaSPM-1, and blaGIM-1 genes were
not detected in any strain (details in Table 2).
All (100%) of the investigated strains had the ability to form a biofilm, but all of them
produced 3.5-fold less biofilm than the reference strain (post hoc Dunnett analysis) (details
in Figure 1). Comparison of biofilm production by strains isolated from IO and IIO showed
that there was no difference in biofilm production, except strain 343/2017, which produced
more biofilm than other strains (post hoc Tukey analysis) but still less than the reference
strain (details in Figure 1).
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CAZ SXT AK GN NET TOB CIP LEV IMP MEM TGC CT
PUS unclassified 18.07.2017 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 2.0/S * * * * * * * *
252/17 I 26.09.2017 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 2.0/S - - 51/23/24 - - + A ST2
262/17 I 28.09.2017 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 1.0/S - - 51/23/24 - - + A ST2
279/17 I 02.10.2017 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 4.0/R - - 51/23/24 - - + A ST2
282/17 I 02.10.2017 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 2.0/S - - 51/23/24 - - + A ST2
342/17 I 16.10.2017 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 2.0/S - - 51/23/24 - - + A ST2
343/17 I 16.10.2017 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 2.0/S - - 51/23/24 - - + A ST2
279/18 II 19.03.2018 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 0.5/S - - 51/23/24 - - + B ST2
284/18 II 19.03.2018 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 0.5/S - - 51/23/24 - - + B ST2
285/18 II 23.03.2018 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 6/R 0.5/S - - 51/23/24 - - + B ST2
PUS—possible unconfirmed source, CAZ—ceftazidime, SXT—trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole, AK—amikacin, GN—gentamicin, NET—netilmicin, TOB—tobramycin, CIP—ciprofloxacin, LEV—levofloxacin,
IMP—imipenem, MEM—meropenem, TGC—tigecycline, CT—colistin, R—resistant, S—susceptible, MIC—minimum inhibitory concentrations, PFGE—pulsed-field gel electrophoresis, MLST—multi-locus
sequence typing, *—not tested due to lack of bacterial strain.
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3.3. Epidemiological Investigation
The epidemiological investigation found a possible unconfirmed source patient (PUS),
who was hospitalized in the ICU in July 2017 by ICT (Table 1, Figure 3). This patient
zero had bronchial tree colonization with XDR A. baumannii (patient without symptoms
of infection). The PUS patient was then transferred to the VSD and stayed there until
the end of September 2017. All patients with SSI caused by XDR A. baumannii were
hospitalized with the PUS patient in the VSD at the same time. Unfortunately, the PUS
patient was not included in the epidemic outbreak because there was neither colonization
with XDR A. baumannii nor another infection when she was transferred to the vascular
surgery unit. Patients included in IO were placed in different rooms but they were looked
after by the same staff in the ward. In September 2017, the bacteriology laboratory was
notified of the first outbreak of A. baumannii in the VSD through an alert to the ICT. The
first epidemic outbreak lasted from 11 September 2017 to 20 October2017. To eliminate
the first outbreak, many activities were undertaken. During the IO, patients infected
and colonized with XDR A. baumannii were cohorted separately in rooms with bathroom
facilities. Dedicated physicians and nurses were chosen to look after patients qualified
for IO. For 1 month, admissions to the surgical ward were halted. In the epidemiological
investigation, 34 hospital inanimate environment examinations (washbasin taps, soap
dispensers, hand care lotion, dressing trolley, cleaning equipment, shower tray, soap,
computer keyboard, blood pressure monitors, bed mattress, ECG machine, mop after
washing, the air in the OR, surgical scrub sinks) and 11 tests from the healthcare workers
(hand swabs from physicians and nurses) were performed. The air in the operating theaters
was tested by the sedimentation method and the result was negative.
No A. baumannii strain was isolated from any of the swabs taken from the inanimate
environment (operating block, VSD) or the hands of healthcare workers. In five cases,
pathogenic bacteria (Escherichia coli, Chryseobacterium sp.) were found on the hands of
medical workers. Acinetobacter haemolyticus was isolated from the hands of one physician.
Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) and Stenotrophomonas sp. were isolated
from the surfaces of various equipment. Moreover, A. haemolyticus was isolated from the
service trolley, Alcaligenes faecalis from the shower tray, and MRSA was isolated from the
cream dispenser. The soap and other equipment tested were sterile.
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Figure 3. Outbreak measures in the timeline of the two outbreaks causing by XDR A. bauman-
nii isolates. ICU—intensive care unit, VSD—vascular surgery department, IO—first outbreak,
IIO—second outbreak, AB—A. baumannii. The arrow marks the date of isolation of A. baumannii
strains. The frames represent the duration of the first (IO) and second (IIO) outbreaks.
In IIO, two patients presenting infection with A. baumannii were detected on 13 March
2018 (279/18, 284/18) and the third on 17 March 2018 (285/18). The patient 285/2018 was
also hospitalized earlier in 2017 during the IO outbreak (Table 1, Figure 3). It was not
possible to suspend patient admissions, so patients with SSI caused by A. baumannii were
cohorted in one patient room, but dedicated physicians and nurses were chosen to look
after patients qualified for IIO.
In the epidemiological investigation during the second outbreak, hospital inanimate
environment examinations (the same as in the IO) and tests from the healthcare workers
were performed. No A. baumannii strain was isolated from any of the swabs taken from the
inanimate environment or the hands of healthcare workers. Only pathogenic bacteria as E.
coli and MRSA were found on the hands of two medical workers. Moreover, Enterococcus
faecalis from the shower tray was isolated. Other equipment tested were sterile. The air in
the operating theaters was also tested, but the result was negative.
Since 2018, no outbreak caused by A. baumannii has occurred in the VSD or any other
hospital units.
3.4. Outbreak Response
In response to the first outbreak, compliance with the sanitary and epidemiological
regime in the unit was tested and recommendations on the conduct in the ongoing outbreak
were issued in writing by the ICT (data not shown). Secondly, healthcare workers from the
vascular surgery unit and the cleaning company were trained on the sanitary and hygienic
regime. Then, isolation procedures were inspected several times during the epidemic.
During the IO, decontamination of the unit’s environment was performed using prepa-
rations containing hydrogen peroxide, chlorides, and quaternary ammonium compounds
for large surfaces; preparations containing chlorides, and cyanuric acid or sodium bisulfate
and sodium tetraborate were used for sinks and toilets and an alcohol-based preparation
was applied for rapid disinfection of small surfaces. During the outbreak, fumigation with
vaporized hydrogen peroxide hydrogen (VHP) was carried out in operating rooms and
the unit, thorough cleaning and disinfection of all rooms and equipment in the vascular
surgery unit were also performed. The epidemiological nurse monitored hand hygiene, the
use of personal protective equipment, and disinfection in the unit, including equipment
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disinfection. Sustained implementation of the recommended infection prevention practices
was observed. In October, the unit experienced cessation of transmission and the last efforts
to extinguish the outbreak took place on 31 October.
In response to the IIO, compliance with the sanitary and epidemiological regime in
the unit was tested, and recommendations on the ongoing outbreak were issued. Health-
care workers from the VSD and the cleaning company were trained on the sanitary and
hygienic regime. During the IIO outbreak, decontamination of the unit’s environment and
equipment in the vascular surgery department was performed. The cohortative room was
fumigated with VHP after patients were discharged. The epidemiological nurse monitored
hand hygiene, personal protective equipment, and disinfection in the unit.
4. Discussion
The epidemic outbreaks analyzed in our study were caused by the strains of A. baumannii
belonging to type ST2, which is a characteristic and dominant clone in Poland and Eu-
rope [39–41]. The ST2 clone was already isolated from previous epidemic outbreaks in
hospitals of Małopolska and Silesia [9,23,42]. The clone belongs to international clone II (IC2),
which is also characterized by the presence of carbapenem-hydrolyzing class D oxacillinases
(OXA), which is the major mechanism of carbapenem resistance among A. baumannii and
the spread of acquired blaOXA genes is well known [43–45]. Carbapenem-resistant A. bauman-
nii strains harboring the blaOXA-58 gene were the predominant type, among others, in Italy,
Greece and Turkey from 1999 to 2009. Then, a huge change in harboring blaOXA genes and
the domination of the blaOXA-23 gene in A. baumannii strains was observed globally [46]. In
our study, A. baumannii isolates accumulated three blaOXA genes. All of them possessed the
blaOXA-51 gene, as the naturally occurring OXA enzyme [47], which was detected previously
among others by Chmielarczyk et al. [23]. The tested strains also harbored the blaOXA-23 gene
as well as the blaOXA-24 gene, which was also characteristic for 19.2% of the strains in the
study by Chmielarczyk et al. We had not detected the blaOXA-58 gene in any strain. In other
studies in Poland, similarly, the blaOXA-58 gene was not detected [23,48]. The ISAba1 gene,
which also contributes to carbapenem resistance, was not detected among any our study
strains. It seems to be rare in Polish A. baumannii strains, as it was also detected previously
in 10 strains out of the total of 125 tested [23]. Less frequently, carbapenem resistance is
also mediated by MBLs, for example, VIM and IMP. In our study, neither the blaVIM, blaIMP,
blaSPM-1, nor the blaGIM-1 genes were found. In a 2016 study by Chmielarczyk et al. [23], only
two isolates possessed blaVIM genes. Analysis of the presence of carbapenem resistance genes
and a phenotypic assessment of susceptibility to all classes of antibiotics demonstrated that the
strains isolated from both IO and IIO are extensively drug-resistant (XDR), which is another
property characteristic of epidemic clone II.
Responsibility for HAI is a significant health problem due to the limited options for
antibiotic treatment of A. baumannii infections. Nowadays, in many cases, colistin is the
key therapeutic option for A. baumannii infection treatment. It could be used alone or with
other antimicrobials such as tigecycline, ampicillin-sulbactam, or carbapenems, if they are
active [49]. In our study, all A. baumannii strains were XDR, with susceptibility to colistin
(only 279/17 was resistant), so this therapeutic option was applicable. However, it is well-
known that colistin therapy leads to the emergence of resistance to these antimicrobials.
Furthermore, colistin therapy often causes side effects in patients [49].
Drug-resistant strains of Acinetobacter have been researched many times as flora that
is persistent in hospitals around the world [50,51]. Drug resistance is a distinctive fea-
ture of HAI strains that linger in the hospital environment in which bacteria are under
antibiotic pressure. It is possible for the Acinetobacter strains to survive in the hospital
environment due to their ability to acquire and accumulate resistance to antibiotics em-
ployed in treatment, but also owing to the ability to produce biofilm [7,52]. In this study,
the strains produced biofilm, however, it was very weak compared to the reference strain.
Kaliterna et al. found, even more, that resistant clinical isolates did not form a biofilm [53].
In other previously done studies, researchers found that a large number of strong biofilm
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producers were drug-susceptible A. baumannii strains [7,54]. In our study, we found that
one of the tested strains produced biofilm biomass stronger than others. It could be due to
the fact that this strain differed slightly from the others in IO, which was also confirmed in
the PFGE analysis.
In our opinion, epidemiological studies are important for monitoring the spread of
XDR A. baumannii isolates in hospitals and should always be undertaken when an epidemic
outbreak is detected. It is known that Acinetobacter may linger in the hospital environment
and potentially be the source of HAI and hospital outbreaks, among others, due to their
transient colonization of the hands of medical staff. In our study, what was detected on
the hands of the staff was the species A. haemolyticus and other microbes representing the
hospital microbiota, however, we did not detect the species A. baumannii. This may be
indicative of only transient contamination of the hands of the staff or personal protective
equipment. In other studies, the authors describe it as the way the epidemic spreads in
healthcare centers [11,55,56]. In the study by Morgan et al. [57], the authors have also
confirmed that it is not only the contamination of the hands of medical personnel, but also
of gloves and coats, that is a potential route of transmission of nosocomial pathogens, espe-
cially the species A. baumannii. It was impossible for us to detect the source of A. baumannii
isolates in the inanimate environment of the ward and the operating theater, which may
suggest that the strains responsible for outbreaks came from patients (PUS patient).
After analysis of the data available, PUS patient was most probably the source of
the IO. It appears that the transmission of Acinetobacter strains and the development
of epidemic outbreaks in hospitals may also result from transferring patients between
departments [12,58]. In the situation analyzed by us, the patient rotation in the department
of vascular surgery and hospitalization of patients in different units, e.g., transferring
patients from the ICU to the department of vascular surgery (PUS patient), resulted in
contact between patients qualified for IO and IIO. During the epidemic, the patients were
staying in the same rooms, so it was possible to become colonized with the epidemic clone
quickly. In the PFGE analysis, it was found that each outbreak was caused by independent
clones (clone A and B in IO and IIO, respectively) which backs the argument that patient
rotation in the unit is conducive to the development of epidemic outbreaks.
It is also generally accepted that A. baumannii clones do not demonstrate such great and
rapid variability as other microorganisms causing hospital epidemics (MRSA, VRE) [12,59,60].
Epidemic outbreaks caused by the same epidemic clone of A. baumannii, which occurred in
long intervals (of over several months), had been described before [12,61].
Based on the molecular methods used, we conclude that the outbreaks and their
sources were separate. The actions taken by the ICT after both, the first and the second
outbreak were correct, effective, and produced the expected results.
In fact, the IO and IIO outbreaks triggered verification and improvement of hospital
procedures and increased the personnel’s knowledge and awareness concerning the pro-
cedures limiting the risk of infection with A. baumannii. Decontamination of the vascular
surgery unit and operating theatre environment using VHP was effective. In our opinion,
the use of VHP was crucial in the attainment of infection control goals during IO and IIO.
The importance of using the VHP in eradicating microorganisms of high environmental
impact such as A. baumannii was emphasized in previous studies [61–64]. In our opinion,
it was equally important that the hand hygiene policy education was provided not only
for HCWs but also for the cleaning staff according to WHO guidelines [36]. The need
for education on the proper hand hygiene procedure and its appropriate application is
considered one of the most essential practices in limiting the number of epidemic outbreaks
and preventing the spread of microorganisms in the healthcare environment [65–67]. What
is more, Wang et al. [11] proved that foreign nursing workers, who were not employed
by the hospital, or relatives of patients who care for them during their hospital stay may
transmit bacteria between patients and may play an important role in the occurrence of
outbreaks. In this context, we are strongly sure that the strategy to control the spread of
resistant microorganisms, such as XDR isolates of A. baumannii, among patients, as well as
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the implementation of appropriate infection control measures and a surveillance program
should prevent HAI infections and epidemic outbreaks in the future.
Our study has some limitations. For example, we had no data about previous out-
breaks (i.e., outbreak from 2015) which could be important in more effective surveillance in
this hospital, and for epidemiological studies in our region and country. We also had no
XDR A. baumannii strain from PUS patient because it had not been frozen, so we could not
conduct a complete epidemiological analysis of IO and IIO. Furthermore, we did not obtain
data concerning antibiotic therapy, so it was impossible to determine the susceptibility of
patients to infections and epidemic outbreaks caused by XDR A. baumannii.
In summary, this study shows a nosocomial spread of XDR A. baumannii ST2 having
the blaOXA-51 gene, the blaOXA-24 gene, as well as the blaOXA-23 gene, low biofilm formers,
that was prevalent in the vascular surgery department. To identify the current situation
of the vascular surgery unit, targeted epidemiological investigation was needed. Due to
phenotypic and molecular characterization of A. baumannii strains, controlling A. baumannii
infections in hospitals presents a serious challenge. It should also be highlighted that the
implementation of infection control effectively prevented the spread of epidemic outbreaks.
It also proved that targeted investigation of molecular epidemiology and healthcare worker
attitudes toward the outbreak of A. baumannii is important and implementation of infec-
tion control can effectively prevent the spread of nosocomial outbreaks caused by XDR
A. baumannii.
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P.K.; validation, M.S., M.B. and A.C.; formal analysis, A.S. and K.T.-Ć.; investigation, A.S., K.T.-Ć.,
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outbreak) were presented by A.S. and TĆ. K. on the Eighteenth Congress of the International
Federation of Infection Control (IFIC), Krakow, Poland, 25–27 April 2018 as poster titled: Investigation
of nosocomial outbreak due to Acinetobacter baumannii MDR in surgical unit. The abstract from the
presentation was published in conference materials as Vol. 14, suppl. 1, p. 65, abstr. P60. Eighteenth
Congress of the International Federation of Infection Control (IFIC), Krakow, Poland, 25–27 April
2018. p-ISSN: 1996-9783.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.
References
1. Garnacho-Montero, J.; Amaya-Villar, R. Multiresistant Acinetobacter baumannii infections: Epidemiology and management.
Curr. Opin. Infect. Dis. 2010, 23, 332–339. [CrossRef]
2. Peleg, A.Y.; Seifert, H.; Paterson, D.L. Acinetobacter baumannii: Emergence of a successful pathogen. Clin. Microbiol. Rev. 2008,
21, 538–582. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
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